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Abstract: 
Sixty years after their creation, the Bretton Woods institutions face a crisis of legitimacy that 
impairs their credibility and effectiveness. At the root of this crisis lies the unrepresentative nature of their 
structure of governance, which places control of the institutions in the hands of a small group of industrial 
countries. These countries consider the developing countries and economies in transition, as minor partners, 
despite their accounting for half of the world’s output  in real terms,1 most of the world’s population and 
encompassing the most dynamic economies and the largest holders of international reserves 2. Over time, 
the effects of the unrepresentative nature of the governance of the BWI s have become aggravated by two 
trends: Firstly, a growing division among member countries, on the one hand   industrial country creditors 
who do not borrow from the institutions but largely determine their policies and make the rules and on the 
other, developing country debtors or potential debtors, subject to policies and rules made by others.    The 
second trend is   the rapid increase in the economic size and importance of developing countries, 
particularly emerging market countries in the world economy.  This trend, has made   the governance 
structure of the institutions, which reflects the political accommodation reached at the end of WWII, 
increasingly obsolete.  
The first part of the paper will review the existing governance structure of the institutions, the 
foundations on which it rests, the main formal proposal to reform quotas and a number of important 
shortcomings and major issues that were not addressed by their proposal.  
The second part takes a different approach. Although in their self-interest, the major industrial 
countries could be expected to favor policies that contribute to the long term   success of the institutions, 
the good performance of the world economy, and the stability of the international monetary and financial 
system, the policies they pursued in the institutions have often been determined by short term expediency.  
A brief review of the performance of the institutions in recent times, conducted in the light of their 
purposes and responsibilities, shows that, despite some conspicuous successes, their limited effectiveness in 
the pursuit of their objectives has not only not enhanced their legitimacy, but often contributed to their loss 
of credibility.   
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1-The Unrepresentative Character of the Governance of the BWI’s 
In 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference a compromise solution was adopted between 
two approaches to the determination of voting power, one which would relate it solely to 
members contributions or quotas and another based solely on the legal principle of the 
equality of states. The compromise based voting rights on a combination of the two:  it 
gave each member country 250 basic votes plus one vote for every $100,000 of quota 
(later for every SDR100,000). Basic votes, and the voice in decision making they gave 
smaller countries were considered to be necessary in view of the regulatory functions of 
the Fund in certain areas. (See J. Gold ). 
Similarly, Article V section 3(a) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement provides that “each 
member shall have 250 votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held”. All 
shares of the Bank’s capital are valued at US$ 120,635 per share. Note that in 1979 all 
members of the Bank were offered to subscribe 250 “membership” shares to avoid 
dilution of the voting power of the smaller members as a result of the 1979 capital 
increase. New members are also authorized to subscribe 250 shares. 
Because the number of basic votes has not been changed with successive quota increases, 
the participation of basic votes in total votes has declined from 11.3 percent of the voting 
power to 2.1 per cent today, despite the entry of 135 new member countries. In fact, as a 
proportion of the total, the basic votes of the original members declined to one half of one 
percent, as a result of  a 37 fold increase in total quotas. 3    This has substantially shifted 
the balance of power in favor of large quota countries, and away from the compromise 
agreement contained in the Articles in order to protect the participation of small countries 
in decision-making.  
Table 1 below shows the relative share of GNI, Quotas and Voting Power of different 
country groupings, and underscores the unrepresentative nature of current quotas and 
voting power in relation to shares of world output.   
Table 1. GDP, Quotas and Votes as Shares of the Total in 2003 
                                                 
3 Consider the power shift that occurs as quotas increase: A country with a quota of ten million would be 
entitled to 350 votes i.e. 100 votes on account of its quota size and 250 on basic votes for being a member. 
When the size of quotas is multiplied by ten, the country will have 1000 votes on account of its quota and 
250 basic votes, for a total of 1250 votes. Thus the relative share of basic votes declines from over 70 
percent to 20 percent of the total. In 1945 there were fourteen countries, almost a third of the membership 
whose quota was $10 million or less, and twenty eight countries, over half of the total, whose quotas were 
$50 million or less. 
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G7 Countries 44.1                   64.4                   46.1                   45.3                   
Other Industrial Countries 8.3                     11.9                   15.6                   15.5                   
Total Industrial Countries 52.4                   76.3                   61.7                   60.8                   
Africa 3.4                     1.5                     5.4                     5.7                     
Asia 26.5                   10.0                   10.3                   10.5                   
Middle East 3.7                     2.6                     7.6                     7.7                     
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.6                     4.8                     7.5                     7.7                     
Transition Economies 6.3                     4.8                     7.5                     7.7                     
Total Developing and Transition 
Countries 47.6                   23.7                   38.3                   39.2                   
TOTAL 100.0                 100.0                 100.0                 100.0                 
Total  Votes                        
(shares, %)
Group of Countries
GDP ppp 2003                           
(shares, %)
GDP 2003                   
(%, shares)
Quotas 2003         
(shares, %)
Source : World Economic Outlook (2005), IMF.  
 
The large differences between the conversion of measurements of GDP measured at 
market exchange rates and in terms of purchasing power parity are shown in the table.   
Table1above. The table shows that when properly measured, the output of the developing 
countries in 2003 approached that of the G7 countries, and the sum of the output of 
developing countries and economies in transition approached that of all industrial 
countries. Since the developing countries are growing at a considerably higher rate than   
industrial countries, the WEO projections indicate that in 2005, developing country 
output is equal to that of the G7.The share of global GDP accounted for by developing 
and transition economies will match that of all industrial countries by 2006.   
2-The Quota Formulas   
Given the role of quotas as the determinant of voting power, any review of governance 
must consider whether they reflect the relative positions of countries in the world 
economy, the   relevance of the variables included and weights assigned to them and the 
transparency of the quota determination process.   
At the time of the Bretton Woods Conference, quotas were assigned several important 
roles, i.e. the determination of countries contributions to the Fund, that of access to Fund 
resources, and their relative voting power. The logic of having only one formula for 
determining these different roles has often been questioned.  As suggested by R.Mikesell 
(1994) and in keeping with the well known postulate of Prof. Tinbergen(1952), of having 
one policy instrument for each policy objective, it would make considerable sense to 
separate the three functions performed by quotas: determination of voting power, 
determination of contributions to the Fund and access to Fund resources.  
However, since at Bretton Woods the membership felt there was merit in having 
contributions and access to resources based on the same formula, such a far reaching 
departure from the traditional role of quotas might make an agreement in the discussion 
of changes in quota formulas considerably more difficult to reach. 
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The formula developed by R. Mikesell in 1943 had the political objective of attaining the 
relative quota shares that the US President and Secretary of State had agreed to give the 
“big four” wartime allies, with a ranking which they had decided:  the US was to have the 
largest quota, appproximately $2.9 billion, the UK including colonies an amount about 
half the US quota, the Soviet Union a quota just under that of the UK; and China 
somewhat less. To achieve this result the formula produced by Mikesell4, after many 
iterations, was based on: 2% of National Income, 5% of gold and dollar holdings, 10% of 
average imports, 10% of maximum variation in exports, and these last three percentages 
to be increased by the ratio of average exports/National Income. 
 It is worth noting that with variations in the weight given to these variables and some 
changes in their definition (i.e. GDP for N.I.), the IMF continues to use the original 
formula; this is combined with four other formulae which include the same variables but 
with different weights. A considerable element of discretion is used in selecting the 
formula to be applied, and in adjusting the results in   estimating member’s quotas. 
Consequently, the determination of quotas lacks transparency.  
 Moreover, while the structure of the world economy has changed rapidly over the last 
sixty years,  as quota increases over the years have been  largely (70%)   
equiproportional, a  considerable element of inertia has tended to perpetuate the initial 
quota structure. Consequently,  present day quotas which at best, represented the 
economic  structure of the world in 1944  are far from representative of the  current sizes 
of economies, of their ability to contribute resources to the Fund or of their importance in 
world trade and financial markets.   
3-The Quota Formula Review Group  
As dissatisfaction with the structure of quotas increased over the years, pressures to 
review the system rose. The Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors on 
the increase in quotas under the Eleventh General Quota Review reaffirmed the view of 
the Interim Committee that the quota formulas should be reviewed, following the 
completion of that quota review. Accordingly, in 1999 the Managing Director requested a 
group of external experts to provide the Board with an independent report on the 
adequacy of quota formulas, including proposals for changes if appropriate. This Quota 
Formula Review Group (QFRG)5 was to be headed by Professor Richard Cooper of 
Harvard University.  
The terms of reference for the study given to the group were broad and included the 
following main areas:  
                                                 
4 Raymond Mikesell “The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir” Essays in International Finance No.192, 
Princeton University, International Finance Section, March 1994 
5 The Quota Formula Review Group (QFRG) was formed by eight experts, consisting of Richard Cooper (Professor at 
Harvard University) as chairman; Joseph Abbey (Executive Director, Center for Economic Analysis, Accra, Ghana) 
Montek Ahluwalia (Member, Planning  Commission, New Delhi, India); Muhammad Al-Jasser (Vice-Governor, Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency); Horst Siebert (President ,Kiel Institute of  World Economics, Germany); Gyorgy Suranyi 
(President, National Bank of Hungary); Makoto Utsumi (Professor, Keio University, Japan); and Roberto Zahler 
(former President of the Central Bank of Chile). 
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--“To review the quota formulas and their working, and to asses their adequacy to help 
determine member’s calculated quotas in the IMF in a manner that reasonably reflects 
member’s relative position in the world economy as well as their relative need for and 
contributions to the Fund’s financial resources, taking into account changes in the 
functioning of the world economy and the international financial system and in the light 
of the increasing globalization of markets.” 
--“To propose, as appropriate, changes in the variables and their specification to be used 
in the formulas.” 
--“To examine other issues directly related to the quota formulas.”  
After looking at the history of the formulas, how variables affect the calculated quotas 
under existing formulas and a number of related issues and undertaking a substantial 
amount of econometric work, the QFRG decided to take a fresh approach and design a 
new formula. This formula was supposed “ to reflect the underlying changes in the 
functioning of the world economy and the international financial system, take account of 
the increasing globalization of markets, and simplify the existing formulas.” (QFRG   
Report, page55). 
The QFRG state their view that: “any new formula should have a sound economic basis 
and should reflect changes in the world economy; that the form and content of any new 
formula should be consistent with the several functions of quotas; that the variables 
contained should not give members incentives to adjust their policies adversely to IMF 
principles; that any new quota formula should be more transparent and easier to 
comprehend than the existing set of formulas and any modification of the quota formulas 
should be feasible, and where problems of data quality or availability arise, such 
modification should be contingent on the resolution of these problems.”(op.cit. pages 56-
57).  
They commented “We recognize that Board discussions have often focused on whether 
developing countries as a group have sufficient voice in the Fund and any decisions on 
the quota formula for the future will have impact on this issue. However, since our terms 
of reference do not make any reference to developing countries as a group, we have not 
taken this aspect into account in recommending a quota formula.” (op.cit. page 56) Thus, 
representativeness of Fund governance and the legitimacy of its decisions were not a  
concern.  
 After extensive work and lengthy deliberations, the QFRG proposed that the Fund adopt 
a single formula with two variables which will, in their judgment, best represent: 1) the 
member’s ability to contribute and 2) the member’s need for IMF resources: i.e. GDP and 
the variability of current receipts and net long term capital flows, with a coefficient for 
GDP twice as large as that for variability.  In their judgement, these variables are those 
that best represent countries’ ability to contribute resources to the Fund and the need for 
financial support by member countries. 
While recognizing that original quotas were politically determined and that the resulting 
quota structure has tended to persist as a result of the relative small size of selective 
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element in quota adjustments (and the gap between calculated and actual shares has 
persisted over time), the Report does not favor rapid quotas changes, as circumstances of 
individual members may change from one review to the next. (Report, page5)  
The Report recognizes that significant changes have taken place in the world economy 
since 1944, in particular greater global economic integration, and the rapid expansion of 
private capital flows and their volatility   have made countries more exposed to external 
shocks.  
4-What the QFRG Missed6 
Recall that, taking into account the role of quotas in the IMF, the QFRG was requested to 
review whether the current quota formulas are adequate and also whether the variables in 
the formulas reasonably reflect the main features of the world economy.   
On the whole, the proposal for the revision of quotas prepared by the QFRG, must be 
seen as disappointing. Through their choice of variables, the group proposed a formula 
that does not take fully into account some of the major changes that have taken place in 
the world economy. In particular, it underestimates the increased participation of the 
developing countries as a group in world output and trade and the rapid growth of some 
of the larger economies among them, as shown in Table 1. Additionally, in view of a 
relative decline in official financing, the volatility of capital flows is important for 
countries without assured access to private capital markets. However, the report fails to 
provide for the problems of vulnerability posed by the extraordinary expansion of 
financial markets and the volatility of short-term capital movements.  
Moreover, their judgments, explicit or implicit, on the size of the Fund 7, the question of 
basic votes, the measurement of GDP, on the issue of vulnerability appear to reveal a  
bias in favor of the preservation of the status quo, in which a small group of industrial 
countries holds the majority of the voting rights,  limits the growth of the Fund and 
access to its resources and excludes the majority of Fund members from   appropriate 
representation, contributions and  participation in decision making commensurate with 
their economic size.  The quota formula proposed, in addition to being subject to the 
                                                 
6 This section draws on  my earlier work,  particularly “ A Critique of the Cooper Report on the Adequacy 
of the IMF Quota Formulas”, Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper Series No.74, Oxford University, 2001    
7 In the light of the broad terms of reference they received, an important issue not considered that has been 
the object of discussion both inside the Board as well as outside it and would appear to require 
consideration is the overall adequacy of Fund resources or total quotas. I will not elaborate on this subject 
here, other than to note that current quotas are equivalent to only 9/10 of 1 percent of world GDP and have 
declined from 58 to under 4 percent of world trade. Moreover, recall that the desire by some to limit quota 
increases and avoid adjusting quota shares to changed conditions in the international economy has led the 
Fund to seek to supplement its available resources by entering into two borrowing arrangements, the 
General Arrangement to Borrow and the New Arrangement to Borrow, with a number of countries in a 
strong international reserve position. These arrangements enable the Fund to resort to them to provide 
additional financing for Fund operations when required.  
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shortcomings mentioned above, would lead to a further concentration of power in the 
hands of industrial countries.  
Despite some valuable work, the errors and omissions of the QFRG report are 
noteworthy. The more significant of these are discussed below:  
a) The Question of Basic Votes 
Since   the erosion of basic votes would appear to be a significant issue in the governance 
of the Fund it is surprising that, despite the broad mandate given to the group, the Report 
failed to consider the possibility of revising them. The only reference   contained in the 
Report goes to say that: 
 ”The IMF’s cooperative nature suggests that potential debtor countries should continue 
to have a significant voice in IMF decision making, a feature that would be dropped by 
basing quotas solely on the ability to contribute (unless redressed by increasing 
substantially the fixed or basic votes to which each country is entitled, which now 
accounts for about 2 percent of total votes-a change that would require amendment of the 
Articles).With quotas and hence voting power, based solely on the ability to contribute , 
some feel that the perspective of prospective borrowing countries would not be properly 
reflected in the management of the IMF.”  
 Thus while recognizing that the cooperative nature of the international institution calls 
for having prospective borrowers represented in decision making in the Fund, the authors 
of the Report    appear to believe that with basic votes accounting for 2.1 percent of the 
total vote, including the vote of developed countries, small potential debtors have a 
significant voice in decision making!  This   argument is entirely unconvincing.8 The 
authors of the Report appear to have forgotten the reasons for the compromise that led to 
basing voting rights on a combination of two criteria and the evolution of basic votes 
over time.  
The importance of basic votes for small countries may be seen from the fact that despite 
their diminished importance, these still account for twenty percent of the voting power of 
1/3 of the membership. Nevertheless, quotas (shares in the case of the Bank) account for 
some 98 percent of total votes and are virtually the sole determinant of total voting 
power. Consequently, the voice of small countries in   decision making has been reduced 
to the point of becoming negligible. A similar process of erosion of the role of basic votes 
has taken place in the Bank over time as a result of successive capital increases.   
Restoring the share of basic votes to say the original 11.3 per cent of the total (Op. cit. 
page 32) would require a more than five fold increase in the basic vote of every member 
country (from 250 to 1324)9 In addition, to prevent the future erosion of the share of 
                                                 
8 One may ask in what parliamentary body such a small representation would be considered to give a major 
party an adequate participation in decision making. 
9 Restoring the proportion of basic votes per member to what it was in 1945 would raise the total basic 
votes to nearly half of total voting power (11.3 x 4.07=46 per cent).An intermediate solution that would 
partially restore the role basic votes were meant to have, would be to assign to basic votes say 25 per cent 
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basic votes in the total, a decision could be adopted by which, in every future quota 
review, total basic votes increase in the same proportion as total quotas.  
The preservation of the share of basic votes in the total would not be an exceptional 
practice among international institutions. Note that being sensitive to the political 
dimension of its work,   the Asian Development Bank‘s Articles of Agreement provide 
that the relative importance of basic votes will remain constant over time as a proportion 
of the total vote (Article 33-1) and that the Articles of Agreement of the Inter-American 
Development Bank provide that no increase in the subscription of any member will 
become effective if it would reduce the voting power of certain countries or groups of 
countries below given percentages of the total. (See External Review of Quota Formulas-
Annex, Box 3.1 page 38).   
b) The Measurement of GDP and the Ability to Contribute  
The QRFG agreed unanimously that the most relevant variable for measuring a country’s 
ability to contribute to the Fund is the country’s GDP. However, the group differed as to 
how GDP measured in domestic currency was to be converted into a common currency to 
determine the relative ability of the country to contribute. The majority favored 
conversion at market exchange rates, averaged over several years, but a minority 
preferred to measure GDP for purposes of the quota calculations using PPP-based 
exchange rates. They considered that market exchange rates do not necessarily equalize 
prices of tradable goods across countries, even after taking into account transport costs 
and quality differences, and that this creates an index numbers problem in which the GDP 
in developing countries is understated in relation to developed countries if market 
exchange rates are used.  
They noted that while real growth rates in these countries have been significantly higher 
than in industrialized countries, the increase in relative size of GDP of developing 
countries is eroded by exchange rate depreciation when converted at market exchange 
rates.(op.cit. pages 57-58) “The majority view argued that while PPP based conversion 
rates were appropriate for measuring relative per capita income for comparing economic 
well being across countries, they were not appropriate for indicating a country’s ability to 
contribute to international endeavors. Second, market prices properly reflect the costs of 
moving goods from one place to another, and equating prices of equivalent goods 
regardless of location, as is done in PPP calculations, gives a seriously misleading 
indicator of the ability to contribute to international undertakings…  The IMF is a 
monetary institution, requiring financial resources for use when members are in financial 
difficulties in their relations with the rest of the world. A country’s ability to contribute is 
therefore determined by its capacity to provide funds at market exchange rates,” (op.cit. 
page 58). 
In the view of the majority, using PPP based GDP, as a measure of a country’s ability to 
contribute would produce serious anomalies, suggesting for example that China could 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the total voting rights. This would mean raising the basic votes of each member country from 250 to 
2,927. 
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contribute one third more than Japan, or that India could contribute more than France. 
Are these criticisms valid?   
In today’s world, where developing country reserves exceed those of industrial countries, 
in what sense is it meaningful to argue that the ability of Japan to contribute is greater 
than that of China and that the ability of France to contribute is greater than that of India? 
Contrary to what is suggested, the relationship between actual contributions as 
determined by quotas and the ability to contribute as a proportion of GDP is very far from 
being a binding restriction. Consider firstly that quotas are a very small proportion of 
GDP, only 1 per cent at the time of the Eleventh Quota Review in 1998 measured in 
market exchange rates (Table 1) and today at  9/10 s of one  per cent, are an even smaller 
proportion. Secondly, note that since conversions of GDP at market rates produce 
significantly smaller GDP’s than PPP based conversions; the   potential contributions by 
developing countries are such a small proportion of their GDP that the argument loses 
any significance. Thirdly, note that only 25 per cent of the member’s contribution or 
quota is paid in foreign currencies. Taken together, these facts   weaken the   ability-to- 
contribute argument, the main argument against the use of PPP-based GDP, to the point 
where it becomes irrelevant.  In any case, countries are free to accept or reject quotas 
proposed and any country that did not feel able or did not wish to accept an increase in its 
contribution could decline a proposed increase in its quota or accept it at a later date. 
Another argument presented against the use of PPP based GDPs is the lack of data. At the 
time, PPP based GDP estimates were available for only 117 countries representing 95 
percent of world GDP….Of course, with effort, data deficiencies can be eliminated over 
time.10 (QFRG report, page 58). You might consider that the availability of data for 
countries accounting for some 95 percent of the total world GDP is not a bad starting 
point if you can work to extend the coverage to other countries, particularly if you have 
several years in which to prepare the appropriate estimates.  
Recall the situation prevalent as regards balance of payments data at the time of the 
Eleventh Review of Quotas,” when data for current receipts and payments through 1994 
were used in the quota formulas. At the time Balance of Payments data supplied for 
publication in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Yearbook were not available for 53 
countries (out of the 183 that participated in the quota review).These gaps were filled by 
information provided by area department desk economists, based on official information, 
and by staff estimates” (External Review of the Quota Formulas -Annex 7, Balance of 
Payments Data used in the Quota Formulas, page  77) Could not the same be done for 
PPP-based GDP estimates? 
The recent staff calculations 11 that would purport to show developing countries are over-
represented, and developed countries under represented,   in relation to calculated quotas, 
are contrary to common sense  and simply show the biases in existing quota calculations, 
even when GNP is converted at market exchange rates. Some striking examples of this 
are shown by Table 2, i.e. the quotas of Denmark, Norway and Austria are larger than 
                                                 
10 Under the ICP, a new estimate of GDP converted in terms of PPP is currently under way covering the 
period 2003-2006; its results could be used in the next quota review to be completed by 2008.  
11 “Quotas-Updated calculations,”  IMF, August, 2004.  
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that of Korea which is a  larger economy and trading nation than the sum of the three   
countries cited above; equally absurd,  the  Belgian quota is larger than those of India, 
Brazil and Mexico, which are amongst the worlds ten largest economies. Similar bias 
obtains when African quotas are compared with those of European countries. 
The major bias against developing countries arises from the conversion of measurements 
of GNP in local currency to US dollars at market exchange rates. By not valuing services 
and non-tradables at international prices this conversion substantially underestimates the 
size of their GNP12.  As is widely recognized by statisticians, due to the volatility of 
exchange rates13, and the fact that the exchange rates do not reflect relative prices across 
countries nor movements in these prices over time, exchange rate conversions of national 
currency values of GNP yield inconsistent results. “They fail to reflect the true levels of 
volumes of goods and services in the aggregates being compared” and “fail to reflect the 
movements in relative volumes of these goods and services over time”.   Purchasing 
power parity conversion eliminates both these inconsistencies14. 
Table 2 - Comparison of Quotas and GDP for Selected Countries 
 
 
 
GDP 2003 
(SDRs) 
GDPppp 2003 
(Share in World) 
Actual Quota    
(SDRs)  
Small European     
Austria 179,834 0.47 1,872  
Belgium 216,136 0.57 4,605  
Denmark 151,905 0.33 1,643  
Finland 115,535 0.28 1,264  
Norway 158,467 0.34 1,672  
Sweden 215,119 0.47 2,396  
Switzerland 221,320 0.43 3,459  
Total 1,258,316 2.88 16,910  
     
Asian     
China 1,008,284 12.69 6,369  
India 428,363 5.83 4,158  
Indonesia 148,977 1.44 2,079  
Korea 432,914 1.86 1,634  
Pakistan 49,214 0.64 1,034  
Philippines 57,624 0.69 880  
Thailand 102,386 0.91 1,082  
                                                 
12  See paper by  Sultan Ahmed ”Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for International Comparisons of Poverty: 
Sources and Methods” in:  website:http//webworldbank.org/wbsite/external/datastistics/cpext/o,pagePK  
13 See paper by J. McLenaghan, former Director of the Statistics Dept. of the Fund, “Purchasing Power 
Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations” in www.g24.org 
14  S. Ahmed op.cit., “PPP is defined as the numbers of units of a country’s currency needed to buy in the 
country the same amounts of goods and services as, say, one US dollar would buy in the United States”. 
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Total 2,227,763 24.05 17,236  
     
Latin American     
Argentina 92,783 0.85 2,117  
Brazil 352,105 2.65 3,036  
Chile 51,790 0.31 856  
Colombia 55,468 0.57 774  
Mexico 447,753 1.82 2,586  
Peru 43,633 0.28 638  
Venezuela 60,641 0.24 2,659  
Total 1,104,173.40 6.73 12,667  
Source: The IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database and the IMF’s Quotas-A 
Factsheet. 
For the above reasons, both the IMF and the World Bank rely on measurements of GNP 
or GNI in PPP in all estimates which involve international aggregates, i.e. of performance 
of the world economy in the World Economic Outlook, and in economic growth 
projections; indeed measurements of output at market exchange rates   are little used in 
an international context, other than in quota calculations. 
c) The Measurement of Volatility of Receipts 
Considering the members potential need for financial support from the Fund, the QFRG 
finds that the single most relevant variable for measuring a country’s vulnerability to 
external disturbances is the variability of its international receipts. 
It is proposed that the variability of international receipts be measured as the standard 
deviation from trend of current account receipts over a 13 year period, with the trend 
measured by the centered five year moving average. The Report admits the possibility of 
refining this variable “by adding to receipts some measure of autonomous net inflows of 
capital, e.g. net long-term borrowing plus foreign direct investment, assuming that 
reasonably accurate information was available on a timely basis.” While these are 
undoubtedly relevant variables, and this is the traditional way of looking at balance of 
payments vulnerability, they are not the whole story. 
In looking at external vulnerability, one may consider: 
a- the degree of openness 
b- the composition of exports  
c- the concentration of exports   
d- the dependence on external financing, particularly on short term capital flows.  
The first of these variables, the degree of openness, is estimated in the current quota 
formula, i.e. openness is measured by the sum of imports and exports as a proportion of 
GDP. Obviously, a closed economy, say one where the external sector accounts for 6 
percent of GDP will be less affected by external developments than a very open one, 
where external sector represents say 50 percent of GDP. In the first case, a collapse of 
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exports will have a limited impact on the level of domestic economic activity while in the 
second case an export collapse will have major consequences in terms of output and 
employment. Thus, since an open economy is more vulnerable than a closed one, the 
degree of openness should be seen as a separate variable, to be distinguished from the 
variability of current receipts. While this variable is not considered by the QFRG the 
appropriate measurement of Vulnerability as a proportion of GDP can take care of this 
factor, thereby making the inclusion of a separate factor for openness unnecessary. 15     
Export composition is an element of vulnerability since exports of commodities are 
subject to greater price fluctuations than exports of manufactures. Thus, a country with a 
high concentration of exports in one or two primary products, say as cocoa, coffee, 
copper, etc. is subject to wide fluctuations in export revenues. Similarly, the 
concentration of exports in one or two markets, whether of manufactures or primary 
products will   result in substantial cyclical variations in export revenues and in a high 
degree of vulnerability for the exporting country. While these well known factors are not 
mentioned explicitly by the QFRG, only the second and third, can be subsumed in the 
proposal for the measurement of variations in current revenues. 
However, trade variables and long term capital flows can not substitute for the 
consideration of   the volatility of short-term capital flows, which as is widely recognized, 
has been the determining factor in the financial crises suffered by emerging market 
economies    that have dominated Fund financial operations in the last decade. Excluded 
from consideration by the QFRG is the member’s dependence on international financial 
markets, particularly the volatility of short-term capital flows.   
The terms of reference for the QFRG refer to “changes in functioning of the world 
economy and the international financial system and in the light of the increasing 
globalization of markets”. Since the increasing role of financial markets and their   
globalization are probably the single most important change that has taken place in the 
international economy, it is surprising that, the variables proposed exclude the volatility 
of short term capital movements, whose reversal played a major role in the financial 
crises emerging markets suffered several years before the QFRG was convened.16 
d) Adjustment of Quotas for Intra-European Trade  
Another important development the QFRG did not consider were the consequences of the 
emergence of the EU as a major trading block in Europe. This may be surprising since 
the European Common Market had been in existence for several decades. The IMF 
recognized the impact of intra EU trade on Quota calculations in its report “External 
Review of the Quota Formulas” EBAP/00/52 Sup. 1 May 1, 2000 which in  paragraph 
100 states:  
“The effect on the calculated quotas of EU countries of excluding all the intra-trade flows 
within the EU –i.e., not taking into account any domestic valued added of such trade- is 
illustrated in table 9.1. The revised calculated quotas would be substantially reduced. In 
                                                 
15 See “Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula” by Laura dos Reis in this volume   
16 i.e. The Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crises of 1997 and 1998, and several others. 
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aggregate, the EU-15 countries’ share would be reduced by 9.2 percentage points (from 
about 37.1 percent to about 28.0 percent). The largest declines in percentage points are 
for Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium”. 
Partly as a result of the distortion generated by intra-trade, the European Union with 15 
members in 2003, and a smaller GDP than the US17, had 74% greater voting power than 
the US and is currently represented by 8 to 9 Directors. European countries are over 
represented in the IMF and World Bank executive boards, both relative to their share of 
world GDP (Table 1 and 2 )and compared with the USA.    To these voices is added that 
of a European Central Bank representative who  participates in the Fund board discussion 
of a number of issues: the WEO, international financial markets and Financial Stability 
Reports, the role of the euro and consultations with the 25 EU members and those with 
prospective members. In contrast, only two African directors represent 46 Sub-Saharan 
countries, many of which have Fund programs and Bank loans.  
Thus, in addition to the problem arising from exchange rate based conversions of GNI,   
the substantial over representation of the EU members arising from the treatment given to 
intra-EU trade flows, the intra-trade flows considered in IMF calculation are an under-
estimation as they did not consider trade in services. 
Following the IMF methodology of the 12th quota review and using OECD data, we have 
made a new estimate of the required quota adjustments which includes services18.  
Moreover, since trade within a single currency area can not give rise to balance of 
payments problems  it is more akin to domestic trade than to international trade. When a 
correction is made for trade in the single currency, the calculated quotas for the 12 Euro 
zone countries decline sharply, falling from 28.3 percent to 16.9 percent, a fall of 11.4 
percentage points. See Table 3 below 
If one reduced the actual quotas of the euro-zone member countries by the same 
proportion as the decline in calculated quotas, the quota share of these 12 countries would 
fall from 23.2% to 13.84%, a reduction of 9.35% percentage points. (or 40.3 %). 
 
Table 3.  Current and Adjusted Calculated Quota for the EU-12 countries 
 
  
Current 
Calculated Quota               
(in millions SDR) 
Share                 
(in percent) 
Adjusted 
Calculated Quota                               
(excluding intra-trade in 
good and services)        
(in millions SDR) 
Share             
(in percent) 
          
EU-12 234,860 28.3  120,926 16.9  
                                                 
17 The GDP of the EU of 25 members is only marginally larger than that of the US at 2003 exchange rates. 
18 The variables modified in order to exclude intratrade in goods and services were payments and receipts.   
The same data as in the 12th review was used in the case of GDP, reserves and variability of current 
receipts. OECD data on trade in services was converted from US$ to SDR at the average rate for each year 
taken from IFS.  
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Austria 9,572 1.2 4,177 0.5 
Belgium 17,709 2.1 6,649 0.8 
Finland 4,955 0.6 2,592 0.3 
France 38,652 4.7 21,593 2.6 
Germany 62,854 7.6 34,872 4.2 
Greece 3,087 0.4 2,031 0.2 
Ireland 9,323 1.1 6,494 0.8 
Italy 30,286 3.6 17,407 2.1 
Luxembourg 12,903 1.6 3,580 0.4 
Netherlands 24,562 3.0 10,990 1.3 
Portugal 4,433 0.5 1,844 0.2 
Spain 16,522 2.0 8,697 1.0 
         
United States 138,060 16.6  138,060 19.3  
Japan 70,364 8.5  70,364 9.8  
        
Other 
countries 387,271 46.6  387,271 54.0  
         
Total 830,556 100.0  716,622 100.0  
5- Recent Discussions on the Formula19 
During the discussion of the QFRG report by the Board in August 2000 Directors 
welcomed the simplification and greater transparency of the proposed formula, but 
expressed the dissatisfaction and concern that its adoption would lead to greater 
concentration of quotas and power among the major industrial countries and requested 
further work should be undertaken on the subject. 
In their quota discussion of June 2002 Directors favored the simpler and more transparent 
approach to the specification of variables to be included in quota formulas. They agreed 
that the number of variables should be limited to no more than three or four at most: GDP 
measuring economic size as the more important variable, a measures of openness, the 
variability of current receipts and net capital flows to reflect the vulnerability of members 
and in the opinion of some, international reserves. 
In their 2003 discussion, Directors considered that a package approach should be adopted 
toward the adjustment of quotas, based on a simplified and transparent formula to 
determine large selective increases, and that additional “ad hoc” adjustments would be 
required for countries whose quotas are more out of line. Basic votes should be increased 
to correct the erosion of the voting power of the smallest countries. Note however, that 
any change in basic votes in the  Fund or Bank require an amendment of the Articles of 
Agreement. 
                                                 
19 The quota formula may be modified by a simple majority of the Board. 
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Recent discussions on governance have shown increasing pressure on the part of 
developing countries, particularly emerging market economies in favor of reforming the 
governance of the BWIs. For instance, at the April 2005 meetings of the IMFC and 
Development Committee, most of the developing country spokesmen pressed the need 
for reform.  
In a recent Communiqué of the G24, stated: 20 “Ministers consider that enhancing the 
representation of developing countries requires a new quota formula to reflect the relative 
size of developing country economies. The formula should be simplified to give greater 
weight to measures of gross domestic product in terms of purchasing power parity, and 
take into account the vulnerabilities of developing countries to movements in commodity 
prices, the volatility of capital movements and other exogenous shocks. In addition, basic 
votes should be substantially increased to restore their original role in relation to total 
voting power and to strengthen the voice of small countries. Ministers are concerned that 
the updated quota calculations contained in the report to IMFC and DC continue to 
understate the role of developing countries in the world economy and run counter to the 
good governance, legitimacy and best interests of the Bretton Woods institutions. ”The 
table that follows shows the distribution of voting power by country groupings that would 
result from a new quota formula  that followed the G24 ministers’ view; i.e. a formula 
based of GDP(ppp) and Volatility. Since quota formulas may be changed by a simple 
majority of the Board while the increase in basic votes requires an amendment of the 
Articles, the table below maintains the current level of basic votes. A table restoring basic 
votes to their original level of 11.3 % may be found in the Appendix. 
Table  4:  Voting Power Distribution with Different Weights assigned to GDP(ppp) 
and Volatility with Current Level of Basic Votes. 
Country Groupings  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
G7 Countries 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.43
Other Industrial Countries 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Total Industrialized Countries 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.52
Africa 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04
Asia 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26
Middle East 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Transition Economies 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06
Total Developing Countries 0.66 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.48
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
 As shown by Tables 1 and 4, the measurement of GDP in terms of PPP favors an 
increase in the quota share of all developing countries by eliminating a measurement bias 
against them.  The introduction of volatility as a factor in the quota formula also favors 
developing countries, particularly exporters of primary products. Despite the volatility of 
capital movements, the inclusion of a volatility factor increases the quotas of primary 
                                                 
20 See paragraph 10, of their Communiqué of October 1, 2004, 
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producers with less diversified exports, more than those of other country group ings.  As a 
result, the relative increases of quotas of Africa and the Middle East.(Table 4). 
Consequently, the reduction of the weight assigned to the volatility factor favors 
emerging market countries, particularly those with a larger GDP and diversified exports. 
As is apparent from the above table, the relative weights assigned in the quota formula to 
these two variables, has a major impact on the overall distribution of quotas.21Since 
industrial countries’ exports are less dependent on commodities than those of developing 
countries, and industrial countries are less subject to capital account volatility, the greater 
the weight assigned to volatility, the smaller their quotas.  
In the recent April 2005 meeting of the IMFC, statements made on behalf of major 
industrial countries   suggested more openness to the consideration of the subject than in 
the past. Thus the US which only a year earlier had taken a negative attitude to the 
discussion of governance, took the view that “governance should evolve along with the 
world economy so that countries positions better reflect their global weights and so that 
all members are more effectively represented…particularly given fast-paced GDP growth 
in emerging market economies and the advent of currency union in Europe.”22 However, 
this is to be achieved without an increase in Fund resources through a “rebalancing of 
quotas” from “over-represented” to “under-represented” countries. This leaves aside the 
difficulty posed by the fact that a country’s quota can not be reduced without its consent. 
Japan pressed for the review of the quotas of emerging markets, stressing that unless the 
Fund responds to the increasing importance of Asia in the world economy it “could 
irrevocably lose relevance in Asia and ultimately in the world.”23 
European countries that stand to lose quota share, were in a difficult position. They had 
agreed in 2002 in the Monterrey Consensus to strengthen the voice and participation of 
developing countries and transition economies in decision making, but with few 
exceptions, are fighting a rearguard action to avoid structural change and preserve the 
status quo to the extent possible. Thus, they favor token administrative measures24, and 
are generally open to a review of basic votes to favor of African countries, which by itself 
would have  limited systemic impact, and appear prepared to consider selective quota 
increases to recognize the increasing role of a few emerging markets in the world 
economy. This changing attitude was reflected in the IMFC Communiqué of April 16, 
2005 which states that:  
“The IMF’s effectiveness and credibility as a cooperative institution must be safeguarded 
and further enhanced. Adequate voice and participation by all members should be 
assured, and the distribution of quotas should reflect developments in the world economy. 
The Committee emphazised that the Thirteenth General Review of Quotas provides an 
opportunity for the membership to make progress toward a consensus on the issues of 
                                                 
21 The detailed calculations underpinning Table 4 may be found in the Appendix. The Appendix also 
shows the calculated quotas of individual countries under various assumptions.   
 
22 Statement by Secretary of the Treasury J.W. Snow to the IMFC on April 16, 2005 
23 Statement by the Minister of Finance of Japan, Sadakazu Tanigaki, to the IMFC on April 16,2005 
24 i.e. enlarging the staff in the offices of African Executive Directors and others 
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quotas, voice and participation.” Nevertheless, the language is vague enough to paper 
over many deep differences that remain, and the way ahead is far from clear.  
Among pockets of resistance to the review of governance are smaller European countries  
which being over represented, fear they may lose their chair in the executive board and 
the committees if a major revision of governance were undertaken. For instance, the 
Dutch minister25 expounded the virtues of mixed constituencies as contributing to 
cooperation between debtor and creditor countries and took the line that the current 
constituency system, by which countries like Belgium and the Netherlands represent a 
mixed constituency is a sound, and presumably, better solution than having developing 
countries speak for themselves. He omitted to mention that since the Articles do not 
allow split voting, the executive directors representing  mixed constituencies  cast the 
vote of all the countries in a manner contrary to the interests of the developing/borrowing 
countries,  who are minority members of the constituency, on such policy issues as 
waivers on conditionality, level of access to Fund resources, the size of the Fund, the 
allocation of SDRs, the need for a precautionary facility to protect countries against 
financial crises and others.26  
6- Other Aspects of the Legitimacy Problem 
In addition to the erosion of basic votes and the unrepresentative character of quotas, the 
problem of legitimacy of the governance has grown over time for functional reasons, in 
particular, the diminished effectiveness of the Fund and Bank. Firstly, it would appear 
that today, Fund surveillance is  only effective over those emerging and developing 
economies that resort to its financial support, but has little if any impact on industrial 
countries and on systemic issues. Why did the Fund lose influence over industrial 
countries and other major economies? 
Firstly, the exponential growth of international financial markets has allowed industrial 
countries easy access to external financing, this access coupled with the growth of their 
own domestic financial markets and the development of regional monetary arrangements 
and reciprocal credit lines among them, make it unnecessary for them to subject 
themselves to the conditionality associated with  IMF support. This trend became 
apparent by the late seventies; as Europe developed its own monetary arrangements; it 
walked away from the Fund.  
As a result there has emerged a growing chasm between shareholders and stakeholders, 
between those who determine  IMF policies and decisions and those to whom those 
decisions and policies are applied. Thus, instead of a cooperative institution to which all 
members contribute and from which they may borrow from time to time, a distinction has 
                                                 
25 Statement by Gerrit Zalm, Minister of Finance of The Netherlands also representing Armenia, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine to the 
IMFC on April 16,2005 
  
26 In fact, the vote of developing countries cast by industrial country directors amounts to some 6.9 percent 
of total voting power. 
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emerged between creditor countries that have the power to make the rules27 and debtor 
and prospective debtor countries, which are subject to those rules.  
A second factor that has eroded legitimacy is the rapid economic expansion of emerging 
market countries, their growing importance in the international economy and their 
accumulation of international reserves. The growth of emerging markets has not been 
reflected by changes in the governance structure of the Bretton Woods institutions. This 
lack of representation made possible the contractionary policy prescriptions required by 
the Fund as a condition for support during the Asian financial crises of 1997-98, 
perceived by a number of countries as inappropriate and contrary to their interests.    
Consequently, in order to avoid having to rely on Fund support in future, Asian countries 
decided to build up their reserves and develop regional monetary arrangements as a form 
of insurance.  The Chiang Mai initiative was established to provide liquidity support to its 
members faced with contagion and speculative attacks against their currencies. Its 
expansion to allow multilateral currency swaps and the doubling of the size of these, 
from $39.5 billion to over $70 billion was agreed by the Finance Ministers meeting in 
Istanbul on May 5, 2005. Reportedly, a fourfold increase in the size of drawings that may 
be made without IMF conditionality was also agreed. In the words of Masahiro Kawai, a 
former Japanese finance ministry official who will head the new regional financial 
integration office at the ADB, “The Chiang Mai initiative has the potential to become an 
Asian monetary fund”28. 
By developing a bond market in domestic currencies, the Asian Bond Fund, also aims at 
reducing the vulnerability of countries to risks of liquidity and currency mismatches that 
could lead to financial crises. 
Thus, in addition to Europe, a growing number of countries in Asia and in Latin 
American   appear to be in the process of moving away from the IMF. To the extent this 
process advances, the IMF would cease to be a truly multilateral institution of monetary 
cooperation and become an institution dealing mostly with the payments problems of low 
income countries in Africa and elsewhere. 
The Loss of a Role and of Effectiveness 
a-The  IMF 
When the Fund was established in 1945 the world lived under an international monetary 
system centered on fixed parities, which gave the  IMF a clear role.  The IMF was to 
enforce a code of conduct designed to prevent the competitive exchange rate devaluations 
and trade restrictions that had given rise to the “beggar thy neighbor “policies in the 
interwar years. To prevent these, the Fund was to approve exchange rate adjustments 
only in cases of fundamental disequilibria. Temporary payments imbalances were to be 
addressed mostly by demand management measures, mainly fiscal and monetary.  The 
support of Fund resources would prevent members from    resorting to restrictions on 
                                                 
27 Note that an agreement reached among G7 members   on policy issues   turns the Board discussion  into a  
mere formality.   
28 Financial Times, May 6, 2005  
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trade and payments or other “measures destructive of national and international 
prosperity”. 
Following the abandonment of the “par value” system, which had been at the heart of its 
role in the international monetary system, the   IMF’s   function was transformed.  Since 
the break down of the par value system in August 1971, when following the inordinate 
expansion of its liabilities, the US suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold to 
protect its gold holdings; the world has lived in a “non-system” in which countries choose 
whether they wish to have floating or fixed exchange rates. Thus, the Fund’s central role 
as arbiter of exchange rates has largely disappeared. 
The Articles of Agreement refer to the general obligations of members regarding 
exchange arrangements and provide the basis for Fund surveillance: 
1) Article IV Section 1(i) assigns the Fund a role of promoting a stable system of 
exchange rates. Observing the 65 percent variations of the exchange rate between two of 
the world’s major currencies, the euro and the US dollar over a small number of years, it 
can hardly be said to have succeeded. 29 
2) Article IV. Section 1 (iii), places an injunction on members to avoid exchange rate 
manipulation in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain 
unfair competitive advantage over other members. A number of countries, mostly in 
Asia, have pursued an export driven development strategy based on fixing their exchange 
rate at very competitive levels in order to promote exports and employment. In this 
process these countries run large trade surpluses and have attracted large flows of foreign 
investment, leading to the accumulation of very high levels of international reserves. 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crises, reserve accumulation was a deliberate and 
justifiable policy by these countries to insure themselves against loss of financial market 
access, the risks posed by volatility of capital flows and the crisis to which they may give 
rise. Noting that the very high level of international reserves held by some countries goes 
well beyond the level necessary to ensure stability, the question may arise of whether 
Fund surveillance has succeeded in promoting international adjustment and preventing 
exchange rate manipulation.   
3) Fund surveillance over major economies has proven to be ineffective in dealing with 
global imbalances. That cumulative US fiscal and current account deficits pose a serious 
danger to the stability and prosperity of the international economy:      
· The dollar depreciation has precipitated rising trade tensions and calls for protection in 
Europe, and other countries whose currencies have appreciated. The rapid growth of 
Asian exports of textiles and other goods has also given rise to calls for protection in 
Europe and the United States. Thus, pressures for protectionism are rising in response 
to   political pressures in countries whose industries are unable to compete. 
                                                 
29 Recall that the euro fell from $1.18 dollars per euro at the launching of the new currency on January 1,199 to a low 
of $0.82 dollars per euro on October  26, 2000 and peaked at $1.363 on December 28, 2004.  
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· On current trends, if the US deficits persist, there is the growing risk that at some point 
the demand for dollars as a reserve asset by foreign central banks, mainly in East Asia, 
will fall as monetary authorities and private investors chooses to hold other reserve 
assets that maintain their value:  euros, yen, or gold. This could take place among the 
industrial, oil- exporting countries, and emerging countries that cannot justify further 
buildup of reserves nor capital losses arising from a declining dollar.   
· A loss of confidence leading to a disorderly depreciation of the dollar would lead to a 
sharp rise in dollar interest rates that would put a sharp brake on the U.S. economy and 
on the growth of Asian and other countries dependent on the U.S. market.   
4) The fact that large amounts of capital flow from poor countries to finance the twin 
deficits of the largest economy, the issuer of the main reserve currency, must be seen  as 
an anomaly and a serious misallocation of resources  from a global economic stand point. 
This is a resource misallocation from the standpoint of developing countries whose 
savings should be invested at home to capitalize and develop their economies. But it is a 
misallocation of resources also from the US medium term perspective. With a rapidly 
aging population, instead of borrowing to finance consumption, the US should sustain 
high rates of investment abroad in order to earn interest, profits and dividends that will 
increase the income of its population as it ages and the proportion of working population 
declines.   
5)While industrial countries are able to, and   pursue counter-cyclical policies  to combat  
recession, emerging and developing countries, which account for half of the world 
output, measured in terms of PPP, are  unable to do so. Given the size of their economies, 
this hinders global economic recovery.  Indeed, emerging market countries are forced to 
pursue pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies by the pro-cyclical behavior of 
international financial markets, as they find it difficult to borrow to sustain their   
economic activity in times of recession.  
6) The US which was the largest creditor country at the time of the Bretton Woods 
Conference always favored conditionality. 30 As debtors, the European countries, had 
resisted conditionality during the first decade of the Fund and favored increasing Fund 
resources, but as their situation changed, they changed their position. This had far 
reaching consequences for the character of the institution, since the countries who 
determine policy and those who are subject to, or governed, by Fund policies, are no 
longer the same. Thus over time a new situation has emerged, characterized by an 
increase in conditionality and a relative decline in the resources of the Fund. This has 
shifted the balance between adjustment and financing in Fund supported programs in 
favor of more adjustment, increased conditionality and resulted in a high rate of program 
failures.31  
Under Article I, Section (v)of the Articles of Agreement, the Fund’s purposes include   
making  its resources temporarily available to members under adequate safeguards, 
                                                 
30 Note that  it has become the largest debtor nation and largest importer of capital. 
31 See A. Buira  “An Analysis of IMF Conditionality “ in Challenges to the World Bank and the IMF”, 
Anthem Press,London,2003  
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providing them with opportunity to correct balance of payments disequilibria   “without 
resorting to measures destructive of national and international prosperity”. Thus, the use 
of Fund resources is intended to mitigate the severity of the adjustment process member 
countries must undertake. In addressing each case, the Fund should seek to strike a fine 
balance between adjustment and financing. When a country has unlimited financing, like 
the United States at present, it is able to resist adjustment, however necessary, for a long 
period of time. At the other extreme, many developing countries undertake adjustment 
without adequate financial support; this increases the economic and social costs of 
adjustment and gives rise to political resistance to the adoption of necessary measures.   
Consequently, the risk of program failure rises.  
To be effective, the Fund must be able to encourage the adoption of adjustment programs 
in a timely manner by offering a level of financing that limits the ir contractionary short-
term effects. However, with industrial country members no longer resorting to the use of 
IMF resources, these were allowed to decline as a proportion of world trade. IMF 
resources thus fell sharply, from 58 percent in 1944 to under 4 percent at present, and as a 
result programs are often under financed. Moreover, since systemically and strategically 
important countries have access to Fund resources well beyond the limits established by 
access policy, there is a lack of transparency and of uniformity of treatment. 
A Fund without adequate financial resources can not perform its role. It can not provide 
incentives to timely adjustment, nor can it be seen as a friend to whom countries can turn 
for support and guidance in uncertain times.  Indeed, when the Fund puts a premium on 
the reduction of aggregate demand and acts pro-cyclically, it pursues what Stiglitz called 
“beggar thyself policies”32.  
7) Surveillance of countries economic, - fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and debt policies, 
requiring the timely provision of data to the markets as well as the application of 
standards and codes, and good regulation and supervision of the financial system may be 
considered   necessary precautionary measures.   But however helpful, standards and 
codes are not sufficient to prevent the emergence of confidence crises that give rise to 
major reversals of capital flows. Since large outflows inflict damage to an economy very 
quickly, the current   policy of IMF lending to the countries after the crisis has caused a 
large depreciation of the currency, and a deep recession, must be considered 
unsatisfactory.     
The approach to crises that would be consistent with the purposes of the IMF would 
require it to provide sufficient financial support to sustain or restore market confidence, 
before the meltdown takes place.33    
                                                 
32 Page 242 of  “Reexamining the Bretton Woods Institutions” in Nayyar, “Governing Globalization” OUP 
2002 
33 This requires an ongoing dialogue between the Fund and the authorities to enable the country to 
approach the Fund at short notice, and the Fund to respond promptly. Countries whose policies were 
considered appropriate by the Article IV consultation and had continued to pursue sound policies would be 
eligible for immediate Fund support. The above procedure could take the place of a formal precautionary or 
insurance facility, and have the advantage of avoiding the signaling problems of the CCL. Looking ahead, 
as the cycle matures, countries with substantial external financing requirements and high levels of external 
debt, will be exposed to reversal of current favorable external financing conditions. Rising interest rates, 
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It is clear that the results attained in the management of systemic issues or of the 
international economy have not gained the Fund greater legitimacy in the eyes of most 
member countries. Moreover, program results are  generally better in terms of improving 
the external balance than growth and employment.  This has been perceived by critics as 
reflecting the priorities of creditors rather than those of the countries themselves. 
b-The World Bank 
The Bank was established with a dual mandate: to help finance the reconstruction of the 
countries ravaged by the Second World War and to assist the developing countries in 
financing their development.34 Since capital shares of the World Bank are distributed 
largely in line with IMF quota shares, the under-representation of the developing world 
undermines its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
As emerging market countries gained access to capital markets they diminished their 
dependence on the Bank as a source of capital. However, most developing countries do 
not have ready access to international capital markets, except for short-term trade finance. 
The provision of longer term financing for development is an important role of the Bank 
even for emerging market countries with access to capital markets, since capital market 
flows are pro-cyclical and loans are for shorter terms than required to finance investment 
projects with long maturities i.e. in infrastructure, health and education and others. In 
addition, Bank project financing is usually combined with the transfer of technical 
knowledge. Drawing on its experience of other countries, the Bank is able to provide its 
knowledge on the policies and institutions that work better, those most conducive to 
development and poverty reduction, as well as to provide technical assistance for the 
solution of the problems of development. 
 
Table 4 . The Operations of the World Bank 
 
           
In millions US$         
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
     IBRD       
Disbursements 18,205 13,332 11,784 11,252 11,921 10,109  
Repayments (-) 10,082 10,398 9,635 12,025 -19887 -18,479  
Net Flows 8,123 2,934 2,149 -773 -7,966 -8,370  
Interest & Charges -7,649 -8,153 -8,143 -6,861 -5,742 -4,403  
Net Transfers 474 -5,219 -5,994 -7,634 -13,708 -12,773  
IDA       
Disbursements 5843 5177 5492 6601 7,019 6936  
Repayments -898 -1285 -1235 -1255 -1,369 -1398  
                                                                                                                                                 
and a decline in commodity prices could trigger speculative attacks leading to a new round of financial 
crises, unless action is taken to prevent it. 
  
 
34 Development financing was included in the mandate of the Bank in response to a proposal by the Finance Minister 
of Mexico supported by Keynes. 
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Net Flows 4945 3892 4257 5346 5,650 5,538  
Interest and Charges -588 -619 -614 -641 -816 -806  
Net Transfers 4357 3273 3643 4705 5,650 4,732  
       
Total Net Transfers  4,831 -1,946 -2,351 -2,929 -8,058 -8,041  
(IBRD+IDA)        
        
 
Unfortunately, after a period of rapid expansion followed by years of stagnation, the 
Bank’s lending operations have declined   in recent years and as a result, net negative 
transfers rose sharply. See table 4 above. This decline in Bank lending limits the 
provision of capital and the transmission of knowledge. Moreover, large repayments 
suggest that the middle income   countries are reluctant to resort to the Bank when they 
have alternative sources of funding.  This is appears to be due to the high non-financial 
costs of loans both in terms of conditionality and the cumbersome  administrative 
procedures leading to delays of disbursements.  Additionally, financial costs are not 
trivial; since the administrative costs of the Bank exceed $1 billion, the equivalent of over 
8   per cent of disbursements, the Bank may be one of the most expensive financial 
intermediaries in the world. 
The Bank has been slow to adapt to changing circumstances, to streamline its procedures 
to become more agile, to develop new products more suitable than traditional loans to 
meet the needs of its members for risk management. For instance, it could be of great 
assistance by developing risk management instruments to reduce the risks arising from 
volatility of commodity prices and capital flows; it could also reduce currency 
mismatches by borrowing and lending in the currencies of emerging market countries 
without putting its capital at risk.35 
A fundamental issue arises from the comparison of the poor growth performance and the 
modest reduction in poverty and inequality in economic reformers pursuing orthodox 
policies and structural reforms in Latin America compared with the high growth rates, 
employment creation and poverty reduction achieved by Asian countries pursuing 
heterodox policies. Over the thirty year period ending in 2000 the per capita income of 
Latin America had risen by 40 percent while that of Asia had increased by 320 percent. 
This differing performance could not fail to undermine the credibility and confidence in 
the pro-market reform policies promoted by international financial institutions.36 Several 
of the most successful Asian countries relied on public enterprises and utilized industrial 
policies, including selective intervention in the allocation of credit, export subsidies, tax 
incentives and protection. 37 
                                                 
35 See Randall Dodd ” Up from Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Salvation” in “The IMF and the World Bank 
at Sixty” Edited by A.Buira, Anthem Press, London, 2005 
36  See Lora, Panizza and Quispe-Agnoli  2004 ”Reform Fatigue: Symptoms, Reasons and Implications” 
Economic Review,Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta  89(2)  
37 See Sanjaya Lall ”Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government  Policy in Building 
Industrial Competitiveness” in The IMF and the World Bank at Sixty edited by A. Buira, Anthem Press, 
London, 2005 
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The issue of ownership arises in the context of both Fund supported programs and of 
Bank loans. There is ample evidence indicating that country ownership is a requirement 
for success.  However a combination of excess conditionality, and lack of pragmatism 
reflecting the unrepresentative character of the governance of both institutions does not 
favor adoption of country priorities, nor of a plurality of approaches in recognition that 
developing societies are distinct and often too complex for standard approaches to their 
problems.    
Last, but not least, the exclusion of the great majority of members in the procedure 
followed for the selection of the new president of the Bank has certainly raised questions 
as to the independence and legitimacy of the institution. Note that in a report of April, 
2001 the Executive Boards had endorsed a report that called for an advisory group to 
make short list of potential candidates, and an open selection process with the 
participation of all members, with candidates chosen on their merits, irrespective of 
nationality. 38 
Conclusion 
The structure of the world economy has changed considerably since the Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1944: the developing countries and economies in transition now account 
for half of the world’s output. China, India, Brazil and Mexico among the world’s ten 
largest economies measured in real terms while other emerging countries also became 
major economic players without attaining adequate representation in the Bank and Fund.  
Because these political and economic changes have not been reflected in the decision-
making structure of the Fund and the Bank, the governance of these institutions and the 
legitimacy of their decisions have become increasingly questioned.    
The quota formulas should reflect the size of the economies of members, in particular 
their GDP, their exposure to trade and capital movements as well as their ability to 
contribute to the Fund.  If quotas formulas were determined in accordance with the 
mandate given to the QFRG 39  and calculated quotas were based on objective measures, 
i.e. size of GNI, the volatility of receipts, the adjustment of European quotas for intra-
trade and trade in the single currency in the euro area,   the quota share of developing 
countries and  economies in transition as a group, should be about the same as that of 
industrial countries. Moreover, given the greater number of countries included in the 
group, with the addition of basic votes, the total voting power of developing countries 
and transition economies would be greater than that of industrial countries as a group.  
                                                 
38 The Bank Working Group to Review the Process for the Selection of the President and The Fund 
Working Group for the Selection of the Managing Director, Draft Joint Report, April 25, 2001  
 
39 “To review the quota formulas and their working, and to asses their adequacy to help determine 
member’s calculated quotas in the IMF in a manner that reasonably reflects member’s relative position in 
the world economy as well as their relat ive need for and contributions to the Fund’s financial resources, 
taking into account changes in the functioning of the world economy and the international financial system 
and in the light of the increasing globalization of markets” (emphasis added). Terms of reference of the 
QFRG. 
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However, the determination of quotas is as much a political as a technical exercise. All 
participants in the discussion are likely to look at what the effect of any proposal on their 
relative position in the distribution of power before expressing a view on the matter. The 
major difficulty lies in persuading industrial countries to agree to reduc ing their share of 
quotas and voting power.  
Consequently, one could suggest that a realistic approach to the problem of the 
distribution of power might start from an acceptable overall outcome, one to which most 
developed and developing countries will agree and then work backwards to define the 
precise manner in which this may be reached, i.e. the weights to be given to the 
components of voting power (i.e. basic vote and quotas), that would produce the desired 
result.  While this procedure may seem somewhat lacking in objectivity, it would be far 
from unprecedented and is probably the only realistic approach to this matter.  
A point of departure for the necessary negotiation leading to the re-apportionment of 
quotas and revision of basic votes could be an agreement that the groupings of industrial 
and developing countries, or of prospective debtor and creditor countries, each have 
about half of the total vote at the Board. A second stage could be the revision of quota 
formulas, particularly the weight to be given to GNP (measured by PPP) and other 
variables. But since it would be difficult to come to an agreement on quota formulas 
without reference to what would happen to the share of basic votes in the total, this would 
have to be a simultaneous exercise. Consider also that changes in the measurement of 
GDP and the inclusion of a variability factor in the quota formula will allow any desired 
result to be attained without having to amend the Articles. 
Over the past   twenty five years, the Fund’s operations have been conducted exclusively 
with the developing countries and, more recently, also with countries in transition.  In 
recent years, the Fund has extended its conditionality to issues of governance. The 
explosive growth of international capital markets has given rise to new opportunities and 
difficult challenges. Thus, while the need for support for emerging market economies 
rose, the size of the Bank and IMF shrunk relative to world trade, and even more in 
relation to international capital movements. This situation has widened the divide among   
member countries. On the one hand is a small group of industrial countries with a 
majority vote; on the other is the large number of largely debtor developing countries 
with a minority vote and limited influence on policies. Consequently, major policy 
decisions on Fund supported programs and Bank policies are often taken outside the 
institutions on a discretionary basis. This power distribution, which raises questions on 
the legitimacy, transparency and accountability of Fund and Bank governance, is eroding 
the relevance of the institutions as Asian and other countries walk away from them.   
Short-term self- interest and expediency appear to have blurred the Bretton Woods vision 
of international cooperation as a means to improve the workings of the world economy. 
The notion that national goals are best attained through international cooperation tends to 
be forgotten. If globalization is to work for all countries, the success of the Fund and 
Bank as multilateral institutions is crucial. For this purpose, the governance of BWIs 
requires a major reform of the quota and decision-making structures to enable them to 
meet the new challenges of the world economy. Industrial countries should be aware that   
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legitimacy and participation in decision making are not contrary to the application of 
sound policies in the exercise of the Bank’s and Fund’s competences.  
 
Apendix -          Towards a New Quota Formula 
The G24 Ministerial Communique’ of October 1, 2004   indicates that the   quota formula 
should be simplified to give greater weight to measures of gross domestic product in 
terms of purchasing power parity, and take into account the vulnerabilities of developing 
countries to movements in commodity prices, the volatility of capital movements and 
other exogenous shocks. In what follows we have performed some numerical simulations 
to allow us to visualize the results this approach would lead to. 
 Since the ministers did not express a view as to the proportion in which these factors 
should be combined, i.e. the relative weight to be assigned to them, the table below 
shows the   distribution of quotas by country groupings that would result from assigning 
GDP(ppp)  and Volatility different weights, ranging from GDP at 60 percent and 
Volatility at 40 percent to GDP at 100 percent and Volatility at 0 percent. 
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Table A 1: Country Distribution of Calculated Quotas with different weights  for    
GDP(ppp) and Volatility,  maintaining  Basic Votes at current level  
G-7 Countries
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Canada 0.0119 0.0137 0.0156 0.0174 0.0192
France 0.0192 0.0223 0.0254 0.0285 0.0315
Germany 0.0270 0.0312 0.0355 0.0397 0.0439
Italy 0.0186 0.0214 0.0243 0.0271 0.0300
Japan 0.0412 0.0480 0.0548 0.0616 0.0684
United Kingdom 0.0195 0.0225 0.0255 0.0285 0.0315
United States 0.1252 0.1459 0.1666 0.1873 0.2080
0.2626 0.3051 0.3476 0.3901 0.4326
Other Industrialized Countries
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Australia 0.0068 0.0079 0.0089 0.0099 0.0110
Austria 0.0032 0.0036 0.0040 0.0044 0.0048
Belgium 0.0044 0.0047 0.0051 0.0054 0.0058
Cyprus 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
Denmark 0.0030 0.0031 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034
Finland 0.0026 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029
Greece 0.0037 0.0038 0.0039 0.0040 0.0041
Iceland 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
Ireland 0.0075 0.0063 0.0052 0.0040 0.0028
Israel 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027
Luxembourg 0.0098 0.0075 0.0052 0.0029 0.0006
Netherlands 0.0060 0.0068 0.0075 0.0082 0.0089
New Zealand 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019
Norway 0.0031 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034 0.0035
Portugal 0.0029 0.0031 0.0033 0.0035 0.0037
San Marino 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Spain 0.0113 0.0129 0.0146 0.0162 0.0178
Sweden 0.0037 0.0040 0.0042 0.0045 0.0047
Switzerland 0.0036 0.0038 0.0040 0.0041 0.0043
0.0786 0.0799 0.0812 0.0825 0.0838
Africa
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Algeria 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038 0.0039 0.0040
Angola 0.0107 0.0082 0.0057 0.0032 0.0007
Benin 0.0021 0.0016 0.0012 0.0007 0.0003
Botswana 0.0019 0.0015 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004
Burkina Faso 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
Burundi 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002
Cameroon 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008
Cape Verde 0.0015 0.0012 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002
Central African Republic 0.0018 0.0014 0.0010 0.0006 0.0002
Chad 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003
Comoros 0.0020 0.0015 0.0011 0.0006 0.0001
Congo, Dem. Republic of 0.0025 0.0021 0.0016 0.0012 0.0008
Congo, Republic of 0.0037 0.0028 0.0019 0.0011 0.0002
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0015 0.0013 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006
Djibouti 0.0082 0.0062 0.0042 0.0022 0.0001
Equatorial Guinea 0.0099 0.0075 0.0051 0.0028 0.0004
Eritrea 0.0064 0.0048 0.0033 0.0017 0.0002
Ethiopia 0.0076 0.0060 0.0044 0.0027 0.0011
Gabon 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003
Gambia, The 0.0023 0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0002
Ghana 0.0021 0.0018 0.0016 0.0013 0.0010
Guinea 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004
Guinea-Bissau 0.0022 0.0017 0.0012 0.0006 0.0001
Kenya 0.0024 0.0020 0.0016 0.0012 0.0008
Lesotho 0.0020 0.0015 0.0011 0.0007 0.0002
Liberia 0.0026 0.0020 0.0014 0.0007 0.0001
Madagascar 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
Malawi 0.0026 0.0020 0.0014 0.0008 0.0002
Mali 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0003  
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Mauritania 0.0017 0.0014 0.0010 0.0006 0.0002
Mauritius 0.0016 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004
Morocco 0.0019 0.0021 0.0022 0.0023 0.0025
Mozambique 0.0116 0.0088 0.0060 0.0033 0.0005
Namibia 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
Niger 0.0013 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006 0.0003
Nigeria 0.0055 0.0049 0.0042 0.0036 0.0030
Rwanda 0.0054 0.0041 0.0029 0.0016 0.0003
Sao Tome and Principe 0.0035 0.0027 0.0018 0.0010 0.0001
Senegal 0.0015 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004
Seychelles 0.0021 0.0016 0.0011 0.0006 0.0001
Sierra Leone 0.0019 0.0015 0.0010 0.0006 0.0002
Somalia 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
South Africa 0.0059 0.0067 0.0076 0.0084 0.0092
Sudan 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015
Swaziland 0.0017 0.0013 0.0009 0.0006 0.0002
Tanzania 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005
Togo 0.0021 0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0003
Tunisia 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
Uganda 0.0015 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009
Zambia 0.0035 0.0027 0.0019 0.0011 0.0003
Zimbabwe 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006
0.1507 0.1227 0.0947 0.0667 0.0386
Asia
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Afghanistan, Islamic State of 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011
Bangladesh 0.0034 0.0038 0.0042 0.0047 0.0051
Bhutan 0.0019 0.0015 0.0010 0.0006 0.0002
Brunei Darussalam 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
Cambodia 0.0016 0.0014 0.0011 0.0009 0.0006
China 0.0763 0.0887 0.1011 0.1135 0.1259
Fiji 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
India 0.0351 0.0408 0.0465 0.0522 0.0580
Indonesia 0.0104 0.0114 0.0124 0.0134 0.0144
Kiribati 0.0035 0.0026 0.0018 0.0010 0.0001
Korea 0.0121 0.0137 0.0153 0.0169 0.0185
Lao, People's Dem. Republic 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003
Malaysia 0.0043 0.0044 0.0046 0.0047 0.0048
Maldives 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002
Marshall Islands 0.0020 0.0015 0.0010 0.0006 0.0001
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.0030 0.0023 0.0016 0.0008 0.0001
Myanmar 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0015
Nepal 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008
Pakistan 0.0046 0.0051 0.0055 0.0060 0.0065
Palau, Republic of                                     0.0064 0.0048 0.0032 0.0017 0.0001
Papua New Guinea 0.0015 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004
Philippines 0.0048 0.0053 0.0059 0.0064 0.0069
Samoa 0.0029 0.0022 0.0015 0.0008 0.0001
Singapore 0.0041 0.0036 0.0031 0.0026 0.0021
Solomon Islands 0.0012 0.0009 0.0007 0.0004 0.0001
Sri Lanka 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
Thailand 0.0065 0.0071 0.0078 0.0085 0.0091
Timor-Leste 0.0034 0.0026 0.0017 0.0009 0.0001
Tonga 0.0027 0.0020 0.0014 0.0008 0.0001
Vanuatu 0.0040 0.0030 0.0021 0.0011 0.0001
Vietnam 0.0030 0.0032 0.0034 0.0036 0.0038
0.2076 0.2215 0.2354 0.2493 0.2631
Middle East
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Bahrain 0.0053 0.0041 0.0029 0.0016 0.0004
Egypt 0.0051 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052
Iran 0.0065 0.0072 0.0079 0.0085 0.0092
Iraq 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Jordan 0.0046 0.0036 0.0026 0.0016 0.0006
Kuwait 0.0259 0.0196 0.0134 0.0071 0.0009
Lebanon 0.0023 0.0019 0.0014 0.0010 0.0005  
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Libya 0.0022 0.0019 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012
Malta 0.0023 0.0018 0.0013 0.0008 0.0003
Oman 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008
Qatar 0.0041 0.0032 0.0023 0.0014 0.0005
Saudi Arabia 0.0049 0.0051 0.0054 0.0056 0.0058
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0026 0.0023 0.0020 0.0017 0.0013
Turkey 0.0063 0.0071 0.0078 0.0086 0.0094
United Arab Emirates 0.0029 0.0027 0.0024 0.0022 0.0020
Yemen, Republic of 0.0063 0.0048 0.0034 0.0019 0.0004
0.0827 0.0717 0.0606 0.0496 0.0385
Latin America and the Caribbean
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008 0.0005 0.0001
Argentina 0.0057 0.0065 0.0072 0.0079 0.0086
Bahamas, The 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
Barbados 0.0009 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002
Belize 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0005 0.0001
Bolivia 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005
Brazil 0.0162 0.0187 0.0213 0.0238 0.0264
Chile 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031 0.0032
Colombia 0.0040 0.0045 0.0049 0.0054 0.0058
Costa Rica 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009
Dominica 0.0023 0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0001
Dominican Republic 0.0023 0.0021 0.0018 0.0015 0.0012
Ecuador 0.0035 0.0029 0.0023 0.0017 0.0011
El Salvador 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007
Grenada 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008 0.0005 0.0001
Guatemala 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011
Guyana 0.0077 0.0058 0.0040 0.0021 0.0002
Haiti 0.0020 0.0016 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004
Honduras 0.0015 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005
Jamaica 0.0028 0.0022 0.0015 0.0009 0.0003
Mexico 0.0115 0.0131 0.0148 0.0165 0.0182
Nicaragua 0.0043 0.0033 0.0023 0.0014 0.0004
Panama 0.0026 0.0020 0.0015 0.0010 0.0005
Paraguay 0.0018 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006
Peru 0.0023 0.0025 0.0026 0.0027 0.0029
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0004 0.0001
St. Lucia 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001
Suriname 0.0058 0.0044 0.0030 0.0016 0.0002
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0017 0.0014 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004
Uruguay 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006
Venezuela 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
0.0995 0.0942 0.0889 0.0836 0.0784
Transition Economies
Country  GDP(ppp) =.60 GDP(ppp) =0.70 GDP(ppp) =0.80 GDP(ppp) =0.90 GDP(ppp) =1
V=.40  V=0.30   V=.20   V=0.10 V=0 
Albania 0.0093 0.0071 0.0049 0.0026 0.0004
Armenia 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003
Azerbaijan 0.0039 0.0031 0.0023 0.0015 0.0007
Belarus 0.0023 0.0020 0.0018 0.0015 0.0013
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0023 0.0018 0.0014 0.0009 0.0005
Bulgaria 0.0024 0.0021 0.0018 0.0016 0.0013
Croatia 0.0040 0.0033 0.0025 0.0018 0.0011
Czech Republic 0.0037 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036 0.0035
Estonia 0.0020 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0005
Georgia 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
Hungary 0.0037 0.0035 0.0033 0.0031 0.0029
Kazakstan 0.0039 0.0035 0.0030 0.0025 0.0020
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0136 0.0103 0.0070 0.0036 0.0003
Latvia 0.0017 0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006
Lithuania 0.0018 0.0016 0.0013 0.0011 0.0009
Macedonia, FYR 0.0027 0.0021 0.0015 0.0010 0.0004
Moldova 0.0022 0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0003
Mongolia 0.0019 0.0015 0.0011 0.0006 0.0002
Poland 0.0062 0.0068 0.0073 0.0079 0.0085  
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Romania 0.0027 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 0.0031
Russia 0.0159 0.0183 0.0206 0.0230 0.0254
Serbia / Montenegro 0.0023 0.0021 0.0019 0.0018 0.0016
Slovak Republic 0.0029 0.0024 0.0019 0.0014 0.0008
Slovenia 0.0011 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
Tajikistan 0.0070 0.0054 0.0039 0.0023 0.0007
Turkmenistan 0.0063 0.0060 0.0058 0.0055 0.0053
Ukraine 0.0026 0.0022 0.0018 0.0014 0.0009
Uzbekistan 0.0070 0.0054 0.0039 0.0024 0.0008
0.1183 0.1050 0.0916 0.0783 0.0649  
 
  
 32 
CSGR Working Paper Series 
 
160/05, May  R Cohen 
   The free movement of money and people: debates before and after ‘9/11’ 
 
161/05, May  E Tsingou 
Global governance and transnational financial crime: opportunities and tensions 
in the global anti-money laundering regime 
 
162/05, May S. Zahed 
'Iranian National Identity in the Context of Globalization: dialogue or 
resistance?' 
 
163/05, May E. Bielsa  
‘Globalisation as Translation: An Approximation to the Key but Invisible Role 
of Translation in Globalisation’ 
 
164/05, May J. Faundez 
‘The rule of law enterprise – towards a dialogue between practitioners and 
academics’  
 
165/05, May M. Perkmann  
‘The construction of new scales: a framework and case study of the EUREGIO 
cross-border region’ 
 
166/05, May M. Perkmann  
‘Cross-border co-operation as policy entrepreneurship: explaining the variable 
success of European cross-border regions’ 
 
167/05, May G. Morgan 
‘Transnational Actors, Transnational Institutions, Transnational spaces: The role 
of law firms in the internationalisation of competition regulation’ 
 
168/05, May G. Morgan, A. Sturdy and S. Quack  
‘The Globalization of Management Consultancy Firms: Constraints and 
Limitations’  
 
169/05, May G. Morgan and S. Quack  
‘Institutional legacies and firm dynamics: The growth and internationalisation of 
British and German law firms’ 
 
170/05, May C Hoskyns and S Rai 
 ‘Gendering International Political Economy’ 
 
171/05, August James Brassett 
 ‘Globalising Pragmatism’ 
 
172/05, August  Jiro Yamaguchi 
‘The Politics of Risk Allocation Why is Socialization of Risks Difficult in a 
Risk Society?’ 
 
173/05, August  M. A. Mohamed Salih  
‘Globalized Party-based Democracy and Africa: The Influence of Global Party-
based Democracy Networks’ 
 
 33 
174/05 September Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell 
The G20 and the Politics of International Financial Sector Reform: Robust 
Regimes or Hegemonic Instability? 
 
175/05 October  Dunja Speiser and Paul-Simon Handy 
   The State, its Failure External Intervention in Africa 
 
176/05 October  Dwijen Rangnekar 
‘No pills for poor people? Understanding the disembowelment of India’s patent 
regime.’ 
 
177/05 October  Alexander Macleod 
‘Globalisation, Regionalisation and the Americas – The Free Trade Area of the 
Americas: Fuelling the ‘race to the bottom’?’ 
 
178/05 November Daniel Drache and Marc D. Froese 
   The Global Cultural Commons after Cancun: Identity, Diversity and Citizenship 
 
179/05 November Fuad Aleskerov 
   Power indices taking into account agents’ preferences 
 
180/05 November Ariel Buira 
   The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation 
University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 
 
Tel: +44 (0)24 7657 2533 
Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2548 
Email: csgr@warwick.ac.uk 
Web address:  http://www.csgr.org 
